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Adverse drug events are the single leading threat to patient safety.
Human factors engineering has been repeatedly proposed, but largely
untested, as the key to improving patient safety. The value of this
approach was investigated in the context of a commercially available
patient-controlled analgesia device that has been linked with several
alleged patient injuries and deaths. Several reports have stated that
errors in programming drug concentration were made during these
adverse drug events. A simulation of the commercially available inter-
face was compared experimentally with a simulated prototype of a new
interface designed according to a human factors process. Professional
nurses, averaging over 5 years of clinical experience with the commer-
cially available interface and only minimal experience with the new
interface, programmed both interfaces. The new interface eliminated
drug concentration errors, whereas the simulated commercially avail-
able interface did not. Also, the new interface led to significantly fewer
total errors and faster performance. These findings may have broad
implications for the design, regulation, and procurement of biomedical
devices, products, or systems that improve patient safety in clinical
settings. q 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
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274INTRODUCTION
Adverse drug events are the single leading cause of medi-
cal injuries, accounting for 19.4% of all adverse events iden-
tified in the landmark Harvard Medical Practice Study [1].
Preventable adverse drug events lead to extended hospital
stays that have been estimated to cost $2 billion annually
in the United States, not including costs of injuries to patients
or malpractice costs [2]. In the follow-up Harvard Adverse
Drug Event Study, analgesics (e.g., morphine, meperidine)
were the most likely drugs to be associated with preventable
medical injury [3]. Furthermore, 45% of the adverse drug
events associated with analgesics involved misuse or mal-
function of drug infusion devices of various types (e.g.,
patient-controlled analgesia). When preventable adverse
drug events were analyzed as a function of stage of delivery,
errors were most frequent in the drug ordering stage (49%),
but 48% of these errors (i.e., 23.5% overall) were detected
and intercepted. Errors in the administration stage were the
second most frequent (26%), yet none of these errors was
detected and intercepted. Thus, substantial improvements in
patient safety may be achieved by focusing on adverse events
occurring during the administration of analgesics using infu-
sion devices. The user programming of patient-controlled
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analgesia (PCA) infusion pumps satisfies this criterion, and
thus is a suitable choice for research on patient safety.
Patient-Controlled Analgesia
Traditionally, analgesia was only delivered in large, infre-
quent doses by a nurse who had to retrieve, prepare, and
administer the drug manually. This process can be ineffective
because patients may become oversedated by large doses,
and inefficient because nurses must perform several time-
consuming steps. PCA pumps have the potential to improve
pain management for patients and reduce workload for
nurses by using automation technology to help patients self-
administer more frequent, but smaller doses of analgesia—
usually morphine [4, 5]. For most patients, the PCA device
is easy to use. Whenever they are in pain, or are about to
do something likely to be painful (e.g., get out of bed),
patients press a push-button on a pendant. If the patient is
eligible to get a dose (as determined by the computer pro-
gram in the pump), a dose of analgesic is pumped into an
intravenous line by an automatic controller. If insufficient
time has elapsed since the last dose (the “lockout period”),
the program denies the patient’s request.
To make sure that patients do not receive too much analge-
sic, a nurse is required to program the PCA pump using
a human–computer interface consisting of displays and a
keypad. First, the nurse manually inserts a drug vial into
the machine. Then, the nurse programs several parameters,
including: the concentration of the drug in the vial, the
dosage that should be given to the patient upon each request,
the lockout interval specifying the minimum time between
doses, and sometimes, the maximum allowable dose over
any 4-h period. The parameters that are entered by the nurse
govern the behavior of the PCA pump (the patient is not
allowed to change the programmed parameters for safety
reasons). There is no way for the pump to verify indepen-
dently if the settings are correct because it cannot sense the
concentration nor the type of analgesic in the vial. Thus, a
programming error could lead to an underdelivery or overde-
livery of analgesic. An overdelivery can, in turn, lead to
patient injury or death. According to one review of Food
and Drug Administration medical device reports 67% of all
problems associated with PCA pumps are attributable to
user error, including programming errors [6].
Abbott LifeCare3 4100 PCA Plus II Infusion Pump
To conduct research on how to make PCA pumps less
error-prone, the Abbott LifeCare 4100 PCA Plus II infusion
3LifeCare is a registered trademark of Abbott Laboraties.275
pump was chosen. This device is used daily at our local
teaching hospitals. Anecdotal reports from nurses indicated
that the device was difficult to program, and thus could
perhaps benefit from being redesigned. The LifeCare 4100
PCA pump is the market leader, has been used on over 22
million patients, and “represents approximately 75% of all
PCA use in the U.S.” [7]. The device is also used around
the world, and in nearly 4000 hospitals in the United States
alone [8]. These figures suggest that the LifeCare 4100 is
frequently and widely used, making it a suitable choice for
research on PCA infusion pumps.
Adverse Drug Event Reports with LifeCare 4100
After the experiment described below was completed, we
learned that several patients had allegedly died or been in-
jured while connected to the LifeCare 4100 [9–14]. The
incidence of such adverse drug event reports appears to be
low [7]. However, it is well known that adverse events in
general, and adverse drug events in particular, are both vastly
underreported. Epidemiological studies have observed re-
porting rates ranging from a low of 1.2% to a high of 7.7%
[15–18]. Using these estimates, for every adverse drug event
that is reported, there are an additional 12 to 82 that go
unreported. “This suggests that using [incident reports] as
a primary data source to study drug-related complications
will be misleading” [15].
From a human factors engineering point of view, an im-
portant question is whether the risk of patient injury or death
can be further reduced systematically [19]. To answer this
question, it is important to know if the aforementioned al-
leged patient injuries and deaths occurred under similar cir-
cumstances. Reports of these adverse drug events have re-
peatedly stated that errors were made in programming drug
concentration [9–14]. The relationship between drug con-
centration errors and patient safety is counterintuitive be-
cause setting the drug concentration at a lower level than
intended can result in repeated overdeliveries of analgesic
[5]. For example, if the vial concentration is set to 1.0 mg/
mL and a dosage of 1.0 mg of morphine is requested, then
the pump will infuse 1 mL of liquid (1.0 mg [desired mass
of morphine] 4 1.0 mg/mL [programmed mass of morphine
per unit volume of liquid in vial] 5 1 mL [volume of liquid
delivered to patient]). But if the actual concentration of
the vial is 5.0 mg/mL, then an infusion of 1 mL of liquid
will deliver 5 mg of morphine rather than the intended 1
mg (1 mL [volume of liquid delivered to patient] 3 5.0 mg/
mL [actual mass of morphine per unit volume of liquid in
vial] 5 5 mg [actual mass of morphine delivered to patient]).
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In addition to being counterintuitive, the effects of drug
concentration errors are also potentially safety-critical be-
cause a single error can have multiple and continued negative
effects. The value that is entered for drug concentration is
used by the device to calculate how much liquid to infuse
for every subsequent bolus dose, how much liquid to infuse
for every subsequent PCA dose, how much liquid to infuse
as continuously delivered analgesic (if chosen, see below),
and when the 4-h safety limit should be invoked. Thus,
entering a lower than intended drug concentration once can
result in up to four enduring effects: (a) an overdelivery of
every subsequent bolus dose, (b) an overdelivery of every
subsequent PCA dose, (c) an overdelivery of the amount of
continuously delivered analgesic, and (d) an increase in the
amount of analgesic that the device will allow to be infused
during a 4-h period. Any one of these effects alone can pose
a threat to patient safety, but the last effect is particularly
important because it relaxes one of the design features that
PCA pumps have to safeguard patient safety [11].
Note that the counterintuitive relationship between drug
concentration errors and patient safety reflects the physics
of analgesic delivery. Thus, it holds for any PCA pump,
not just the LifeCare 4100 (although some pump interface
designs may be more likely to induce this type of error than
others). In sum, the key implication from the adverse drug
event reports is that minimizing the incidence of drug con-
centration errors is particularly critical to ensuring patient
safety with PCA pumps. Can this class of errors be reduced
by device redesign?
The design of the interface has been consistently cited as
a contributing factor in adverse drug event reports with the
LifeCare 4100 [9–14]. For example, the Emergency Care
Research Institute stated: “the likelihood of this sort of mis-
programming is increased by the fact that the user interface
and programming logic of the pump are particularly complex
and tedious. We believe that the likelihood of user error is
increased by the repetitive and time-consuming program-
ming process required by this pump” [11]. Thus, the Life-
Care 4100 interface can be used as an experimental testbed
to see if the application of human factors engineering tech-
niques can make PCA pumps even less prone to error, partic-
ularly to drug concentration errors.Human Factors Engineering
Other safety-critical industries, such as nuclear power and
aviation, have reduced human error by applying techniques
from human factors engineering [20]. This discipline focuses
on the interaction between technology, people, and theirLIN, VICENTE, AND DOYLE
work context. Human factors has sometimes been narrowly
associated only with human–computer interface design
guidelines, such as “minimize the load on users’ memory,”
but a comprehensive human factors design process is much
broader and consists of several activities, including [21]:
x Continuous involvement of representative users
throughout the design process, starting right at the very
beginning;
x Field observations to understand the actual conditions
under which users work with technology;
x Task analysis to identify the job demands and perfor-
mance bottlenecks faced by users;
x The use of human factors design guidelines (see below
for examples) to ensure that technology is compatible with
human capabilities and limitations;
x An iterative design process that leverages user feedback
to improve initial design concepts;
x Experimental evaluations of detailed design prototypes
with representative users based on objective measures of
performance, not just subjective opinion;
x Post-market surveillance (e.g., review of adverse event
reports) to identify unanticipated threats to safety that can
be removed or reduced by redesign.
Given the success obtained in other safety-critical indus-
tries, medical researchers have often noted that a comprehen-
sive human factors engineering process may be the key to
improving patient safety [22–25]. However, direct empirical
evidence of the potential benefits of applying human factors
to medicine is still relatively scant. The primary aim of this
article is to investigate whether PCA pump interfaces could
be made less error-prone by redesigning them using a human
factors engineering approach.
Previous Research
Before learning of any adverse drug event reports, Lin
and colleagues had already redesigned the commercially
available interface for the LifeCare 4100, depicted in Fig.
1a, using human factors engineering techniques [26]. First,
comments were obtained from recovery room nurses who
had extensive experience with the device, field observations
were conducted in the postsurgical recovery room at a teach-
ing hospital, and a task analysis was conducted using bench
tests. These activities identified information requirements
that could serve as a basis for a device redesign.
Second, the commercially available interface was anal-
yzed using some of the most basic design principles of
human factors engineering:
meFIG. 1. (a) Old interface for LifeCare 4100, a simulation of the com
Copyright 1997 by Laura Lin [27]. All rights reserved.
x Provide users with prompt, salient feedback after
each action;
x Make the functions of the various controls clear and
obvious;
x Make the displayed messages easy to understand;
x Minimize the load on the users’ memory;
x Provide users with reliable shortcuts to increase
efficiency;
x Provide clearly marked exits for the user to leave the
system.
This analysis identified several aspects of the commer-
cially available interface that could perhaps be improved
(e.g., complex dialogue structure, limited feedback, inconsis-
tent control functionality, confusing layout of controls, and
confusing message displays).
Third, Lin et al. redesigned the interface for the LifeCare
4100 using human factors design principles and the informa-
tion requirements they had identified [26]. The result was
a New prototype interface, shown in Fig. 1b, that has essen-
tially the same functionality as the commercially available
interface, but includes several design changes, such as fewer
programming steps, an overview display showing the user’s
location in the programming sequence, more display feed-
back, a more logical layout of controls, and clearer wording
for labels and messages.
Two concrete examples can be used to illustrate how a
human factors approach helped to uncover aspects of thercially available design. (b) New prototype interface for LifeCare 4100.
commercially available design that could be improved. The
LifeCare 4100 can be operated in three different modes:
PCA, Continuous, and PCA 1 Continuous (see below for
a description of each). In the commercially available inter-
face, the programming sequence presents these options one
at a time. At each step, nurses can either accept the currently
displayed option and set the mode, or they can reject that
option and go on to the next one. Lin et al. observed that
the three modes are not independent; they are three alterna-
tive ways of operating the device. By presenting the three
options serially, the commercially available design may be
more complex than it needs to be, requiring users to make
up to three decisions to select the device mode. Accordingly,
Lin et al. used the principle of “Provide users with reliable
shortcuts to increase efficiency” to redesign the interface.
In the New interface, related options are presented in parallel
wherever possible, so that only one decision is required to
choose among the available related alternatives. Conse-
quently, the programming sequence of the New interface
appears simpler than that of the Old, as illustrated in Fig.HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING 2772. (Detailed descriptions of each step in these thumbnail
sketches are provided by Lin [27].)
A second example of how human factors was used to
identify opportunities for redesign involves the setting of
drug concentration. In the factory-set configuration (see be-
low), the LifeCare 4100 sequentially offers four default op-
tions for programming drug concentration (i.e., morphine
Decision
Message-guided actions
the
commercially available and new interfaces for the LifeCare
4100 with professional nurses who already had extensiveFIG. 2. Thumbnail sketch of the programming sequences: (a) For
Lin [27]. All rights reserved.
1 mg/mL, morphine 5 mg/mL, morphine 0.5 mg/mL, and
meperidine 10 mg/mL). Lin et al. noted that: “The default
values provided on the current interface conflict with the
standard operating values used at TGH [Toronto General
Hospital]. For example, the most widely used concentration
is 2.0 mg/mL. Users must currently toggle through four
screens of default values before being able to enter this
concentration. Making suitable default settings available
would eliminate many of these unnecessary programming
steps” [26]. Accordingly, Lin et al. again used the principle
of “Provide users with reliable shortcuts to increase effi-
ciency” to redesign the interface. The initially displayed
concentration value was changed to match the value that is
most frequently used at TGH. As a result, the first concentra-
tion value that users encounter in the programming sequence
with the New interface would be more likely to be the
desired value.
Finally, Lin et al. conducted an experiment comparing
computer simulations of the commercially available and
New prototype interfaces with nursing students as partic-
ipants. The results showed that the New prototype led to
statistically significant reductions in errors, programming
times, and mental workload ratings [26].Execution of an action
Old interface, and (b) for the New interface. Copyright 1997 by Laura
The individual findings reviewed thus far have each been
previously reported in the literature. By collecting and integ-
rating this body of evidence in the same article for the first
time, the significance and implications of these findings for
patient safety become more clear. In the remainder of the
article, we describe the primary novel contribution of the
present work—an experiment comparing simulations of the278 LIN, VICENTE, AND DOYLE
a) Old Interface b) New Interfaceexperience programming the commercially available inter-
face. This activity is an essential part of a comprehensive
human factors engineering process [21]. The most important
question was whether the New interface would reduce the
incidence of drug concentration programming errors.METHOD
Participants
Twelve recovery room nurses from TGH participated in
the study. They averaged 5.15 years (SD 5 1.19) of clinical
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
experience with the LifeCare 4100. These nurses were on
a rotational schedule in which they programmed PCA pumps
for 1 to 3 weeks each month. When they were on the assigned
rotation, a nurse would program the LifeCare 4100 from 2
to 10 times per day. Institutional review board approval and
informed consent were obtained.
Materials
Simulations of the New prototype and commercially avail-
able interfaces running on an IBM-compatible personal com-
puter were used [26]. The simulation of the commercially
available interface was a high-fidelity visual replica, and
will be referred to as the Old interface. Its functionality was
essentially the same as that of the commercially available
interface (see below). The primary difference was that the
Old interface required participants to input data using a
mouse, whereas the commercially available interface re-
quires nurses to use touch keypads. Given these minor differ-
ences, and the fact that functional fidelity plays a stronger
role than physical fidelity in transfer of training for proce-
dural cognitive tasks [28], the participants’ extensive experi-
ence with the commercially available interface was expected
to generalize to the Old interface.
Both the Old and New interfaces have eight programming
functions. The purge function would allow users to remove
air from the intravenous line before the line is connected to
the patient. The concentration function specifies the numeri-
cal value and the units of the drug concentration (e.g., 1
mg/mL). The bolus function would allow users to administer
a one-time infusion of analgesic (e.g., 1 mg). The mode
function would allow users to choose between the three
different modes in which the device can be operated. In the
PCA mode, the device would deliver only discrete, patient-
requested doses of analgesic. In the Continuous mode, the
device would function as a normal infusion pump (i.e., pro-
vide a continuous delivery of analgesic with no possibility
for patient-requested doses). In the PCA 1 Continuous
mode, the device would function in a hybrid mode with a
continuous delivery of analgesic as well as the possibility
for additional delivery of discrete, patient-requested doses
of analgesic. The lockout interval function specifies the mini-
mum time between patient-administered doses (e.g., 5 min).
The 4 h limit function specifies the maximum amount of
analgesic that could be delivered during any 4-h period (e.g.,
30 mg). The PCA dose function specifies the amount of
analgesic that would be delivered for each patient-requested
dose (e.g., 1 mg). The continuous dose function specifies
the amount of analgesic that would be continuously delivered
per unit time (e.g., 1 mg/h).279
The commercially available interface for the LifeCare
4100 can be configured to operate in several different ways
[10]. The configuration in regular use at TGH and simulated
by the Old interface is the factory-set standard. In this config-
uration, the pump sequentially offers four options for pro-
gramming the concentration of the drug in the vial: morphine
1 mg/mL, morphine 5 mg/mL, morphine 0.5 mg/mL, and
meperidine 10 mg/mL. At each step, nurses can either accept
the currently displayed option and set the drug concentration,
or they can reject that option and go on to the next one. If
all of these are rejected, then several additional options
are presented sequentially. This latter set of options can
be selected if a drug other than morphine or meperidine
is desired.
Experimental Design
A 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 mixed design was adopted with Order of
training (Old first and New first) as the between-participants
factor, and Interface (Old and New), Programming Task
Mode (PCA, Continuous, and PCA 1 Continuous), and
Repetition (1st and 2nd) as the within-participant factors.
The orders of the Interfaces and the Modes were both
counterbalanced.
Procedure
Participants read a set of instructions on how to use one
of the PCA interfaces and performed three practice tasks.
Every participant then completed a total of six different tasks
(two Repetitions of each of the three Mode types). For each
task, participants were given a TGH PCA Order Form and
were asked to program the interface according to the op-
erating values specified on the Form. The same six Order
Forms were used for both interfaces. The quantitative values
of several programming parameters (e.g., drug concentra-
tion, PCA dose, continuous dose, lockout interval, and 4-h
limit) varied across the six Order Forms. To reduce confusion
between interfaces, participants were brought in for a second
day, and were instructed and tested on the alternate interface
using a comparable procedure.Dependent Variables
There is only one correct action sequence for each pro-
gramming task, so an error was defined as any deviation from
this gold standard, regardless of whether it was subsequently
Bolus 4 8
Mode 11* 3280
corrected. Errors were classified according to the eight pro-
gramming functions described earlier. Examples of errors
include answering a YES/NO question incorrectly, entering
an incorrect numerical value for one of the programming
parameters, and choosing the incorrect option among several
displayed alternatives. Task completion time was measured
as the interval between the time that participants turned the
simulation on and the time of the last programming action.
To evaluate the degree of mental work that participants
expended during each programming task, subjective mental
workload ratings were collected after each trial using the
NASA-TLX rating scale [29]. This scale is a sensitive and
reliable measure of mental workload that is well-accepted
and frequently used in the human factors engineering litera-
ture. The NASA-TLX method requires participants to rate
their experience on six different subscales that have been
found to contribute to mental workload (i.e., Mental De-
mands, Physical Demands, Temporal Demands, Own Perfor-
mance, Effort, and Frustration). The participants’ ratings on
these individual subscales are then combined to obtain an
overall workload rating for each participant for each trial.
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed
and their subjective preferences and qualitative comments
were both recorded.Data AnalysisErrors and the subjective preference ratings were analyzed
using x 2 tests, except when there was a small number of
observations, in which case a binomial test was used instead.
Task completion time and workload ratings were analyzed
using a mixed analysis of variance. All statistical tests that
were significant at a level of P , 0.05 are reported. No
other tests reached statistical significance.
RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes the error data. In total, more errors
were made with the Old interface than with the New
(x 2(1) 5 6.1, P , 0.02). Also, more errors were made in
programming the mode function with the Old interface than
with the New (x 2(1) 5 4.6, P , 0.05). Most importantly
of all, no drug concentration errors were made with the New
interface, whereas eight such errors were made with the Old
(binomial test, P , 0.008). Three of these errors were not
detected and left uncorrected.
The statistically significant effects for task completionLockout interval 0 0
4-h limit 1 0
PCA dose 4 1
Continuous dose 0 1
Total: 29* 13
* Indicates a statistically significant effect, P , 0.05.
time are shown in Fig. 3. The New interface was faster than
the Old (F(1, 10) 5 12.17, P 5 0.006). Also, the second
repetition was faster than the first (F(1, 10) 5 21.81, P 5
0.001). In addition, the Modes differed, the PCA 1 Continu-
ous Mode being the slowest and the PCA Mode being the
fastest (F(2, 20) 5 5.4, P 5 0.013). Finally, there was an
interaction between Repetition and Mode (F(2, 20) 5 5.64,
P 5 0.011). The reduction in time with Repetition was
smaller in the PCA Mode than in the other two Modes,
probably because the nurses had the most experience with
programming that Mode in clinical practice.
The statistically significant effects for mental workload
are shown in Fig. 4. Workload was lower for the second
repetition than for the first (F(1, 10) 5 6.27, P 5 0.03).
Also, there was a Repetition 3 Mode 3 Interface interaction
(F(2, 20) 5 8.62, P 5 0.002). The percentage reduction in
workload with Repetition was larger with the New interface
than with the Old for the Continuous and PCA 1 Continuous
Modes. Participants seemed to find it progressively easier
to program the two less familiar Modes with the New inter-
face than with the Old.
Nine nurses favored the New interface and one preferred
the Old (x 2(1) 5 6.4, P , 0.02). Two nurses expressed no
preference. The qualitative comments provided by partic-
ipants for the Old interface describe some of the problemsLIN, VICENTE, AND DOYLE
TABLE 1
Summary of Errors by Interface and by Programming Function
Function Old New
Purge 1 0
Concentration 8* 0that participants experienced initially in learning how to use
the commercially available device in a clinical setting, the
positive impact of frequency of use on ease of programming,
and the importance of involving representative users in the
design process. The comments for the New interface are
generally more positive and consistent with the objective
performance results, although there was one suggestion for
how to improve the design of the bolus function.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING 281p 1,
in [2FIG. 3. Statistically significant effects for task completion time. Re
Mode; P 1 C, PCA 1 Continuous Mode. Copyright 1997 by Laura LDISCUSSION
This experiment appears to be the first to evaluate the
impact of a human factors engineering process on the rede-
sign of a commercially available medical device with experi-
enced users. The New prototype interface for the LifeCarefirst repetition; Rep 2, second repetition; P, PCA Mode; C, Continuous
7]. All rights reserved.4100 eliminated drug concentration errors, whereas eight
such errors were observed with the Old interface, three of
which were uncorrected. This finding should be treated with
caution due to the low number of observations per partic-
ipant. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the concentration
errors were eliminated with the New prototype despite the
, fi
n [2FIG. 4. Statistically significant effects for mental workload. Rep 1
Mode; P 1 C, PCA 1 Continuous Mode. Copyright 1997 by Laura Li
fact that the nurses had only minimal exposure with this
interface, but averaged over 5 years of experience with the
commercially available interface. This result shows that
presenting a new design to users who have extensive experi-
ence with an old design for the same device need not “cause
a huge increase in errors that result from users exercising
an over-learned, previously appropriate, response” [30].
In a clinical setting, the three uncorrected concentration
errors could have resulted in repeated overdeliveries of anal-
gesic to patients. For example, one participant mistakenly
accepted the initially displayed concentration value of 1 mg/
mL when the desired concentration value was 2 mg/mL. In
a clinical setting, this error could have resulted in a twofold
overdelivery of morphine every time a dose was delivered
to the patient. Recall that the programmed concentration
value is used to calculate when the 4-h limit should be
invoked. Thus, this same concentration error could also have
allowed 60 mg, rather than the intended limit of 30 mg, to
be infused over any 4-h period, thereby relaxing one of the
safety features of the device. Adverse event reports have
repeatedly stated that concentration programming errors are
an important potential threat to patient safety in PCA pump
usage [9–14].
The New interface also led to faster completion times,rst repetition; Rep 2, second repetition; P, PCA Mode; C, Continuous
7]. All rights reserved.
and was preferred by a strong majority of nurses. There was
no significant difference in mental workload ratings between
interfaces. The subjective comments obtained from the par-
ticipants generally favored the New interface, and thus were
in agreement with the objective performance data. For exam-
ple, one participant stated that the New interface was simple,
user friendly, and easier to learn to use than the Old interface.
These subjective comments, and the observed reductions in
programming errors and times, confirm the informal impres-
sion created by Fig. 2 that the New interface is simpler to
program than the Old.
When combined with our earlier work, these results show
the value of following a comprehensive human factors engi-
neering process as opposed to only relying on human factors
design principles alone. Lin et al. were unaware of any
patient injuries and deaths with the LifeCare 4100, so they282 LIN, VICENTE, AND DOYLEcould not have based the New design on adverse drug event
reports [26]. Furthermore, they had not conducted an experi-
ment with professional nurses. Nevertheless, as mentioned
earlier, Lin et al. redesigned the LifeCare 4100 interface so
that the initially displayed concentration is a high, rather
than a low, value because the higher concentration value
was more frequently used in clinical practice.
tors might enhance patient safety by putting a greater empha-
sis on human factors engineering design criteria when mak-HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
Reviews of adverse events and experiments with represen-
tative users are essential parts of a human factors engineering
system design process [21]. In this research, these two activi-
ties uncovered new safety-relevant evidence that had not
been identified using design guidelines alone. This new evi-
dence did not point to a need to change the prototype created
by Lin et al. because the initially displayed concentration
value had already been changed for reasons of efficiency.
However, in other cases, new information identified by re-
views of adverse events or testing with representative users
may identify a need to make further design changes to the
interface [31].
This research has limitations that suggest future research
topics. First, the participants were recovery room nurses
who program PCA pumps up to 10 times a day. Floor nurses
also sometimes program PCA pumps, but typically far less
frequently. Thus, it would be useful to replicate this experi-
ment with floor nurses as participants. Given the partic-
ipants’ qualitative comments regarding the importance of
frequency of use on ease of programming with the commer-
cially available design, the impact of interface redesign may
be even greater than that observed here. Second, nurses are
frequently interrupted when they program PCA pumps in
clinical practice, but they were not interrupted in this experi-
ment. The impact of interruptions should be investigated.
The benefits of the New interface may be even greater under
such conditions because it provides more feedback than the
Old. If nurses do not have to rely as much on memory, then
they may be able to see, rather than remember, in what
state they left the device after an interruption. Third, both
simulated interfaces used a mouse for data input, whereas
the commercially available device uses a keypad. More re-
search is required to determine how the absolute level of
performance would change if a keypad were used. Note,
however, that the primary focus of this research was not the
absolute level of performance of either interface, but rather
the relative level of performance between interfaces. There-
fore, the difference in input modality is not of great concern
for our purposes because there is no reason to believe that
using a mouse would affect one interface more than the
other, particularly since Interface was a within-participants
factor. Because both interfaces required all participants to
use a mouse instead of a keypad, the safety and efficiency
benefits of the New interface cannot be attributed to the
input modality. Fourth, the experiment was conducted in a
laboratory rather than in a field setting. Clinical trials must
be conducted to see if the results obtained here generalize
to actual use. Finally, this work only investigated one device,
although the same process can be used to design, or redesign,
virtually any biomedical device, product, or system.283
CONCLUSIONS
Adverse drug events are the leading threat to patient safety.
This research showed that, by redesigning a commercially
available PCA pump interface using a human factors engi-
neering process, drug concentration errors and task comple-
tion times were both reduced for experienced users under
laboratory conditions. The generalizability of these findings
to other PCA pump interfaces, to other drug delivery devices,
and to other medical products or systems can only be defini-
tively established with more empirical research. However,
the success of human factors engineering in improving safety
in other domains, such as aviation and nuclear power, sug-
gests that the benefits of this approach are likely to generalize
widely [20].
To take just two biomedical informatics-related examples,
previous human factors engineering research has shown that
both an interface for a computer-based patient-monitoring
system for use in cardiac anesthesia and an interface for a
computer-based infusion device for terbutaline therapy to
treat preterm labor suffer from unnecessarily complex dia-
logue structures that cause difficulties for device users [32,
33]. The research presented here goes two steps further
by showing how these limitations might be systematically
addressed by device redesign, and by suggesting that such
changes may result in safety and efficiency improvements.
If these predictions are confirmed, then human factors
engineering may have important implications for the design,
regulation, and procurement of biomedical devices, prod-
ucts, or systems. Medical manufacturers might enhance pa-
tient safety by adopting a human factors engineering process
in the design of their products. Government medical regula-ing product approval and regulation decisions. Finally,
hospital risk managers and procurement staff might enhance
patient safety by adopting human factors engineering
criteria—particularly user testing and evaluation—before
making product purchasing decisions.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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